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ABSTRACT
Mexico's experience before and after trade liberalization presents a challenge to neoclassical trade
theory. Though labor abundant, it nevertheless exported skill-intensive goods and protected labor-
intensive sectors prior to liberalization. Post-liberalization, the relative wage of skilled workers rose.
Courant and Deardorff (1992) have shown theoretically that an extremely uneven distribution of
factors within a country can induce behavior at odds with overall comparative advantage. We
demonstrate the importance of this insight for developing countries. We show that Mexican regions
exhibit substantial variation in skill abundance, offer significantly different relative factor rewards,
and produce disjoint sets of industries. This heterogeneity helps to both undermine Mexico's
aggregate  labor  abundance  and  motivate  behavior  that  is  more  consistent  with  relative  skill
abundance.
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The increase in income inequality experienced by many Latin American countries 
after trade liberalization presents a challenge to neoclassical trade theory.  If a country is 
relatively labor abundant, then an increase in openness should boost the relative return of 
less-skilled labor and cause a decline in income inequality rather than an increase.  In 
fact, the relative demand for skill in Latin America rose following liberalization (Wood 
1997).  The rising demand for skill in Mexico, one of the first Latin American countries 
to liberalize, has received considerable attention (Cragg and Epelbaum 1996, Revenga 
1997, Feenstra and Hanson 1997, Meza 1999, Feliciano 2000, Robertson 2000, Esquivel 
and Rodriguez-Lopez 2003, Verhoogen 2004). 
A partial explanation for this trend is that tariff reductions raised the relative price 
of skill-intensive goods.  Hanson and Harrison (1999) and Robertson (2004), for 
example, show that, prior to liberalization, Mexico imposed higher tariffs on labor-
intensive goods and that, after liberalization, the country disproportionately reduced 
tariffs on labor-intensive products.  Robertson (2004) demonstrates that tariff changes 
alone account for about one third of the change in Mexican relative prices.  This 
explanation, however, merely raises the more fundamental question of why a labor-
abundant country like Mexico would act in a manner inconsistent with theory and protect 
its abundant rather than scarce factor. 
Relatively high protection for labor-intensive sectors is not the only puzzling 
feature of Latin American trade.  Mexico’s relatively high exports of skill-intensive 
goods, for example, also contradict theory. Before 1986, the year Mexico joined the 
GATT, more than half of the country’s exports were in Chemicals and Machinery, which 
use skilled workers relatively intensively (Figure 1).  Table 1 reveals that these industries  




have the third and fourth highest average education levels and the second and fourth 
highest non-production to production worker ratios in Mexico.  Exports of textiles, which 
are relatively labor-intensive, in contrast, were low.  As a result, Mexico’s trade pattern, 
like its tariff structure, was more consistent with that of a skill-abundant country than a 
skill-scarce country.     
In this paper, we argue that Mexico’s behavior is driven in part by its internal 
distribution of factors.  Courant and Deardorff (1992) have shown theoretically that 
extreme factor “lumpiness” across regions within a country can prompt production and 
trade patterns that contradict the country’s overall comparative advantage. To our 
knowledge, their contribution has not yet found any empirical support.  Our focus on 
Mexico’s factor lumpiness here, therefore, serves to both highlight the empirical 
relevance of Courant and Deardorff’s result and to help resolve a puzzle about the effect 
of liberalization in Latin America that has received a great deal of attention in the 
literature. 
In Mexico’s case, sufficient regional concentration of skilled workers forces skill-
abundant regions to offer relatively low skilled wages and thereby specialize in the 
production of relatively skill-intensive goods.  As a result, the country becomes a net 
importer of labor-intensive products and has an incentive to protect its abundant rather 
than scarce factor.  In the language of trade theory, factor lumpiness distributes Mexican 
regions across two or more cones of diversification, where the word cone refers to the set 
of region endowment vectors that select the subset of industries in which regions 
specialize. 
We examine the plausibility of factor lumpiness as an explanation for Mexico’s 
behavior by testing one of its key implications, namely whether relative factor prices are  




equal across the country’s regions.  We use a technique developed by Bernard and Schott 
(2003) that is based on very general assumptions about production, markets and 
unobserved differences in region-industry factor quality. We find that the relative skilled 
wage varies significantly and substantially across Mexican regions and that this variation 
is associated with product-mix specialization.  As implied by theory, regional skill 
abundance and the relative skilled wage are negatively correlated.   
Our analysis demonstrates that Courant and Deardorff’s insight is particularly 
important for understanding the impact of trade liberalization on developing countries.  In 
a skill-abundant country like the United States, skilled-worker lumpiness merely 
reinforces aggregate comparative advantage by promoting relatively higher exports of 
skill-intensive goods.
1  In labor-abundant countries like Mexico, however, extreme 
regional concentration of skilled workers can result in exporting and import protection 
that contradict the implications of the standard model. 
As a result, our findings highlight the usefulness of factor lumpiness in explaining 
why Latin America presents such a persistent “challenge to conventional wisdom” 
(Wood 1997).  They also emphasize the need for further empirical and theoretical 
research into its consequences.  Table 2, for example, reveals that Latin America as a 
whole, and Mexico in particular, have exceptionally high rates of urbanization among 
developing countries. If skilled workers tend to cluster in cities to a greater extent in 
Latin America than in other parts of the developing world, then Latin American 
economies may be more susceptible to rising income inequality as they liberalize.  More 
                                                 
1 Bernard and Schott (2003) report a lack of relative factor price equality across regions of the United 
States.  Debaere (2004), discussed further below, investigates factor lumpiness in Japan, India and the 
United Kingdom.     




generally, reducing trade barriers in Latin America may have very different consequences 
than similar reforms in Asia or Africa, where skilled workers are distributed more evenly.  
This paper makes two additional contributions to the study of globalization.  First, 
our findings regarding intra-national factor price equality complement the broader 
literature on the extent to which relative factor prices are equal across countries.  Indeed, 
given that regions within a country may more closely approximate an integrated 
equilibrium than countries within the world trading system, a lack of relative factor price 
equality within a country casts further doubt upon its existence internationally.
2    
Our analysis also reveals that gauging the degree of regional specialization within 
countries is critical for understanding the within-country effects of trade liberalization 
across countries.  By expanding the set of goods countries produce, factor lumpiness 
extends the product-mix overlap of countries with very different relative factor 
endowments.  This expansion elevates the level of direct competition between countries 
with markedly different relative wages, thereby rendering them susceptible to relative 
wage movements via price-wage arbitrage that would not occur under a more even 
internal distribution of factors.   
The remainder of the paper unfolds in six sections.  First, we review the findings 
of Courant and Deardorff (1992) to illustrate how factor lumpiness influences production 
and trade patterns.  Since we do not extend the theory, we present only a brief graphical 
description to illustrate the basic concepts.  In Section II we describe the data and stylized 
facts that emerge from them.  Section III outlines our test for factor price equality.   
                                                 
2 Recent research by Repetto and Ventura (1997), Debaere and Demiroglu (1998), Davis and Weinstein 
(2001) and Schott (2003) indicates that countries span multiple cones of diversification.  




Empirical results are presented in Sections IV and Section V discusses the potential 
influence of maquiladora production on our results. Section VI concludes.   
I.  Trade and Lumpiness 
To illustrate the insights of Courant and Deardorff (1992), consider a world with 
two goods (X and Y) that are produced with two factors (N and P for skilled workers and 
unskilled workers, respectively) in a country with two regions (A and B).  Further assume 
that the country is small and open in the sense that it takes relative goods price as given, 
and that factors do not move between regions within a country.
3  The consumption vector 
is therefore fixed, as relative consumption depends only on relative prices.  Assume good 
X is skill (N) intensive and good Y is labor (P) intensive. 
The basic intuition is straightforward.  We begin by assuming that the two factors 
are evenly distributed between the two regions and that the regions are of 
(approximately) equal size.  Given a usual production technology, the initial relative 
endowment of factors within the country can be represented by the familiar Edgeworth 
box shown in Figure 2 as point 1.  The points along the upward sloping diagonal OAOB 
are the points that represent an equal relative distribution of factors in the two regions A 
and B.  Endowments falling into the area of the parallelogram OAaOBb represent 
endowments that would elicit production of both goods by both regions as well as factor 
price equalization (FPE) within the country. Along the diagonal OAOB both regions 
would produce identical relative amounts of the two goods.  Endowments within the 
parallelogram above (below) the diagonal result in region A producing relatively more of 
good X (Y). 
                                                 
3 We address the empirical validity of this assumption later in the text.  




If factor N were reallocated from B to A, such as along the arrow from point 1 to 
point 2, production of X would increase in A and fall in B until the border of the 
parallelogram was reached.  This would have no effect on international trade, however:  
given fixed relative demand, the increased production of X in A is offset by a decrease in 
the production of X in B.   
At the border of the parallelogram, however, region B would stop producing X 
altogether and completely specialize in the production of Y.  Moving further along the 
arrow to point 2 (outside the parallelogram) increases the production of X by A without a 
corresponding decrease in the production of X by B.  Since world prices are fixed by 
assumption, the excess production of X is exported.  In fact, any endowment point in the 
areas labeled “Export X” represents an allocation of factors that is sufficiently lumpy to 
induce exporting of X. 
Regional endowments within the parallelogram result in relative factor price 
equalization across regions.  As a result, factor allocations from point 1 to the border of 
the parallelogram have no effect on relative wages.  Once the endowment point crosses 
the border, however, regional relative wages and product mix diverge.  It is precisely this 
implication of the model – a breakdown of relative factor price equality and concomitant 
differences in regional product mix – that we test for in the Mexican data.
4 
The relationship between factor lumpiness and the pattern of trade protection is 
straightforward.  Without geographically concentrated factors, the relative wage of 
skilled workers in Mexico would fall with trade costs as Mexico takes advantage of its 
                                                 
4 Deardorff (1994) offers an alternate approach for verifying factor lumpiness that indirectly tests for the 
conditions that give rise to factor price equality, i.e. whether the factor abundance of regions is bounded by 
the factor intensity of industries as illustrated in Figure 2.  The reliability of this approach, however, 
depends upon the relative aggregation of industries and regions (Debaere 2004 and Bernard et al. 2004).    




overall comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods.  With skilled-worker lumpiness, 
however, the relative wage of skilled workers rises because opening to trade increases 
exports of the skill-intensive good, raising its price and the relative wage of skilled 
workers along with it.  Since there is no mechanism for unbalanced trade, increased 
exports of the skill-intensive good mandate greater imports of the less-skill-intensive 
good, providing an incentive for protection of the abundant factor. 
A many-good, multiple-cone equilibrium extension of the model can be 
represented with the traditional Lerner diagram displayed in Figure 3.  The figure 
displays two Mexican regions, MA and MB, which have equal numbers of unskilled 
workers but an unequal allocation of skilled workers.  These regions inhabit cones of 
diversification defined by four goods, denoted by Leontief unit value isoquants, that 
increase in skill intensity from 1 to 4.
5  The skill intensities of each good are noted by 
dashed lines emanating from the origin.  Figure 3 also notes Mexico’s aggregate 
endowment point.  
Without lumpiness Mexico occupies the middle cone of diversification.  In this 





A w w / , in each region.  Assuming it was sufficiently labor abundant within the 
middle cone of diversification, it would be also be an exporter of relatively labor-
intensive good 2 and an importer of goods 4, 3 and 1.  As a result, protection of the skill-
intensive import sector would be most likely.  As a resident of the middle cone, aggregate 
Mexico would produce one good that overlaps with the most skill-abundant cone and one 
                                                 
5 We use Leontief production technologies in Figure 3 to keep the diagram simple.  The same story can be 
told using technologies that display factor substitution.        




good that overlaps with the most skill-scarce cone.  Occupants of these cones might 
include United States and China, respectively.     
Factor lumpiness within Mexico forces MB into a more labor-intensive cone of 
diversification than region MA via the same logic outlined above.  As a result, MB 
produces goods 1 and 2 rather than 2 and 3 and offers a relatively high skilled wage 








A w w w w / / < .   The geographic concentration of skilled 
workers induces the country into being an exporter of the relatively skill-intensive good 
(3) and an importer of its relatively labor-intensive good (2), thus changing the country’s 
incentives for protection.  Indeed, the potential demand for import protection is 
heightened by the fact that MB now produces a product-mix (goods 1 and 2) that is 
identical to the product mix of the world’s most labor-abundant countries.  As a result, 
relative wages in Mexico are susceptible to product price movements in good 1 as well as 
goods 2 and 3.  Declines in the relative price of good 1, due to China’s emergence as a 
major exporter, for example, lower the relative wage of low-skilled workers in region MB 
and heighten the country’s overall income inequality more so than would occur if the 
country’s factors were evenly distributed.         
Both Hanson and Harrison (1999) and Robertson (2004) speculate that the threat 
of competition from countries more labor-abundant than Mexico may have been a factor 
in the country’s decision to protect labor-intensive industries relatively heavily both 
before and after joining the GATT in 1986.
6   Factor lumpiness – by increasing the set of 
                                                 
6 Hanson and Harrison (1999) present evidence showing that, prior to GATT,  Mexican tariffs were higher 
on less-skill-intensive industries.  This pattern remains after GATT as well.  A bivariate, industry-level 
regression of average MFN tariff rates (percent) on industry skill intensity (i.e., the ratio of non-production 
to production workers), weighted by industry employment, yields coefficients (and standard errors) of -17.6 
(4.7) and  -7.1 (2.5) for 1985 and 1987, respectively.  The relatively large tariff reductions on less-skill- 




industries Mexico and the world’s most labor-abundant countries produce in common – 
provides a rationale for this concern.   Indeed, the expansion of Mexico’s product mix 
means that relative wages in Mexico are influenced by a greater number of goods via 
price-wage arbitrage than would be the case if all regions of the country inhabited the 
middle cone of diversification.     
It may seem intuitively appealing to suggest that Mexico had an incentive to 
protect and be a net importer of labor-intensive goods in the absence of factor lumpiness 
if it were primarily concerned about trade with relatively labor-abundant trading partners.  
Several facts, however, are at odds with this explanation.  First, data from the NBER 
trade database show that, from 1970 to 1992, Mexico’s annual average trade share with 
countries that were clearly relatively skill abundant was greater than 90 percent 
throughout the period, including the United States and Canada (69 percent), Europe
7 (16 
percent), and Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (5 percent).  Second, Mexico’s 
dominant import substitution industrialization paradigm, which shaped tariffs and is often 
said to have formally ended when Mexico joined the GATT, was motivated by concerns 
about the adverse effects of trade with more-developed, not less-developed, countries.  
These facts suggest that concern about trade with more labor-abundant countries – 
without factor lumpiness – is not a compelling explanation of Mexico’s behavior. 
 
II. Data and Stylized Facts 
                                                                                                                                                 
intensive goods that contributed to the change in prices documented in Robertson (2004) were not enough 
to change the protection bias towards less-skill-intensive industries. 
7 Europe includes Belgium-Luxembourg., Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, EEC n.e.s, Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  




The ideal data for analyzing lumpiness in Mexico would include comprehensive 
information (over both regions and industries) on employment and wages over a 
relatively long time period.  Mexico's Industrial Census, conducted by the Institutio 
Nactional de Estadística Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Mexico's national statistical 
agency, is well suited for this exercise.   For this study, we use manufacturing data from 
the 1986, 1989, 1995, and 1999
8 Industrial Censuses, which provide data for the prior 
year.  The Census contains information on the employment of production workers 
(obreros) and non-production workers (empleados), as well as aggregate payments to 
each type of worker (the wagebills).
9  The data classify Mexican industries using the 
Clasificación Mexicana de Actividades y Productos (CMAP) which, over all years, 
contains 314 six-digit industrial categories (the industries listed in Table 1 represent the 
first two digits of the six-digit classification system). 
The data cover 32 Mexican regions (31 states and the Federal District (basically 
Mexico City)).  Figure 4 shows the Mexican states, and Table 3a shows the distribution 
of total manufacturing employment across states.  In 1985, the central region of Mexico 
(Mexico City and Mexico State) had 35% of all manufacturing employment.  This share 
falls over time, which Hanson (1997) notes and attributes to trade liberalization that shifts 
the focus of the market towards the border.  (We discuss this shift in more detail in 
Section V.)   
Table 3b reports the number of industries produced in each region.  The number 
of industries is highest in Mexico State and Mexico City and lowest in Baja California 
                                                 
8 More information about the Mexican Industrial Census can be found at http://www.inegi.gob.mx. 
9 Use non-production worker status as a proxy for skilled workers seems to capture much of the skill 
segregation between industries in Mexico.  Robertson (2004) shows that Mexican production workers have 
less education in every industry than non-production workers, and that industries with a higher ratio of non-
production workers also have higher average education levels.    




Sur, Campeche, Queretaro and Quintana Roo. A key implication of factor lumpiness is 
that regions in different cones produce different sets of goods.  Below, we test whether 
product mix overlap across regions is a function of estimated relative factor rewards.   
 
III. Production Structure and Relative Wages 
We test for the equality of relative wages across Mexican states using an 
empirical approach developed by Bernard and Schott (2003).  This test is robust to 
differences in unobserved factor quality as well as variation in the composition of factors 
both across regions and industries.  We briefly review the derivation of the approach 
here.   
We begin by assuming that production in industry j and region r can be 
represented with a constant returns to scale technology that combines quality-adjusted 
skilled workers (N) , unskilled workers (P) , and capital (K).   Using B to denote the unit 
cost function, 
z
rj θ  to denote the unobserved quality of factor z, and 
z
r w  to represent the 
wage of the quality-adjusted factor z, cost minimization generates the following relative 
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The null hypothesis is that quality-adjusted relative wages are the same across all regions 
within each industry.  Under the null, observed wages differ across regions within an 
industry only because of unobserved differences in factor quality.  Using region s as a 
benchmark and a tilde (~) to denote observed values, observed relative wages can be 
represented as   

















  If we then multiply observed relative wages and employments in (1) and (2), the 
unobserved factor quality terms cancel out.  If quality-adjusted relative wages are 
equalized across regions and relative unit factor input requirements are the same, then 
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The alternative hypothesis is that quality-adjusted relative wages differ across regions r 
and s by a factor  rs γ .  The source of the regional variation in quality-adjusted relative 
wages is taken to be exogenous and can include variation in factor endowments, trade 
costs, or non-tradable amenities.  A key implication is that relative unit inputs would also 
vary within an industry, which, in turn, implies that observed relative wage bills differ 
across regions.  The difference in wage bills would be a function of rs γ , which we 
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so that a finding that  1 rsj η ≠  is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis.  To test this 
hypothesis empirically, we normalize the relative wage bill in each region r by the 
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P, dr is a set of regional dummy variables, and  rsj ε  is a stochastic 
error term. Finding that the set of regional dummy variables is jointly significant is the 
empirical analog to finding that  1 rsj η ≠  and therefore is sufficient to reject the null 
hypothesis.  Furthermore, as described by Bernard and Schott, positive estimated values 
of 
s
r α  imply lower relative wages for skilled workers in region r relative to the base 
region. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
A. Baseline Estimates 
We begin by estimating (5) using all of Mexico as the base region.  The base 
region relative wage is calculated by summing the wage bill for each of the two types of 
workers across all regions by industry, and then dividing these sums.  The relative wage 
for each industry-region is calculated by summing all of the payments to each type of 
worker within each industry-region and taking the ratio of the sums.  The dependent 
variable in (5) is the latter divided by the former. 
Table 4 contains the initial results for each census year.  Several results are 
noteworthy.  First, nearly all of the estimated coefficients on the regional dummy 
variables are statistically significant.  They are also jointly significant, which is sufficient 
to reject the null hypothesis of factor price equalization across Mexican states.  Second, 
the vast majority of coefficients are negative.  In fact, there are only two statistically 
significant positive coefficients: Mexico City and Mexico State.  These two regions have 
the largest shares of manufacturing employment as well as the largest shares of skilled 
workers.  




Table 4 also shows the results to be relatively stable across time periods.  In all 
years, Mexico and Mexico City are the only regions with positive and statistically 
significant coefficients.  As well, the vast majority of the coefficients that are negative 
and significant in 1985 are also negative and significant in 1999.  The similarity of 
coefficients across time in Table 4 also reveals that relative wage differences are 
relatively stable.  The estimated coefficients for Mexico State, for example, are the same 
in 1986 and 1999.  For Mexico City, the coefficients for 1986 and 1999 are 0.218 and 
0.233.  Assuming a CES production function and an elasticity of substitution of 2.0, these 
two estimates would correspond to relatively skill-abundant Mexico City having quality-
adjusted relative wages for skilled workers (compared to unskilled workers) that were 
24% and 26% lower than the average for Mexico in 1986 and 1999.  Comparing the 
states of Mexico and Puebla, the results suggest that quality-adjusted relative wages for 
skilled workers in relatively skill-scarce Puebla were 52% higher than those in the state 
of Mexico. 
One potential concern with the results in Table 4 is that they might be overly 
dependent on the presence of Mexico City and Mexico State.  We therefore drop Mexico 
City and Mexico State from the data and repeat the analysis.  Table 5 contains the results.  
As indicated in the table, overall results without these two regions are very similar to 
those reported in Table 4.  The relatively poor states (Oaxaca, Michoacan, Guerrero) 
remain near the bottom, and Nuevo Leon emerges at the top.  The results in Table 5 are 
also stable across time.  The Pearson correlation coefficient between 1985 and 1999 is 
0.908 and all pairwise Pearson coefficients (matching all possible year combinations) are 
above 0.90.  Mexico City and Mexico State certainly do stand out as positive outliers, but  




the same states emerge near the bottom with large, negative, and significant coefficients 
regardless of whether or not Mexico City and Mexico State are included. 
The relative stability of the estimates raises the question of labor mobility within 
Mexico:  why is it that persistent regional relative wage differentials are not arbitraged 
away by the movement of labor across regions?  Hanson (2003), using Mexican 
Population Census data, finds within-country migration to be relatively small;  workers 
within Mexico do not seem to move enough to erase large regional wage differentials. 
Topel (1986) suggests that less-skilled workers are less mobile than more skilled 
workers, which may apply to Mexico.  If migration costs (including information) are 
higher than the expected gains, workers will not migrate to erase regional wage 
differentials. 
 
B. Relative Wages and the Production Structure 
  The results in Table 4 suggest that relative wages are not equalized across regions 
within Mexico.  Theory predicts that regional variation in relative wages coincides with 
differences in regional production patterns.   We test for such differences formally via the 
OLS regression 
  01 2 3 ˆ
s
rs r r s rs ZI I β βα β β υ =+ + + +, (6) 
where Zrs represents a the number of industries common to regions r and s, the  ˆ
s
r α  are the 
estimated bilateral relative wage bill differences from equation (5), and the final term 
represents a stochastic error.  The intuition behind this regression is that regions that have 
larger differences in estimated relative wages should have fewer industries in common.  Ir 
and Is represent the number of industries produced by regions r and s, respectively, and  




are included to capture the possibility that simply having more industries makes industry 
overlap between other regions more likely.   
The results are shown in Table 6.  In all census years, the number of industries in 
common falls as the absolute difference in the relative wage bill rises.  This evidence 
offers strong and consistent support for the idea that the differences in regional relative 
wages affect the distribution of regional production.  Based on the results in Table 4 for 
1999, the estimated relative wage differences between Mexico City and Guerrero 
accounted for 23 fewer industries in common.  
The results of this section are sufficient to reject relative factor price equality 
across Mexican states.  Together with our estimates of product mix differences across 
states, these results lend support for the view that Mexico’s distribution of factors is 
lumpy enough to influence the country’s pattern of trade and, therefore, its pattern of 
trade protection.  
 
V. The Role of Foreign Investment 
An important trend in Mexican manufacturing over the past 25 years has been the 
development of maquiladora establishments.  Maquiladoras are “in-bond” assembly 
plants that import parts into Mexico, assemble them, and then export the assembled 
products.
10  In this section we show that maquiladoras are concentrated in relatively skill-
scarce industries in relatively skill-scarce regions.  As a result, it does not appear as if 
their rise over time explains Mexico’s status as a net exporter of relatively skill-intensive 
goods. 
                                                 
10 For a good introduction to the maquiladora industry, see Vargas (1999).  




Maquiladoras are primarily foreign owned and, by law, had to locate in the U.S. 
border region prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  This was to 
the advantage of the firms, since this location minimized transportation costs of imported 
inputs.  It also worked to the advantage of the Mexican government because the 
government considered the maquiladora program part of its border development 
program.
11  In any case, since they exist for assembly, it is perhaps not surprising that 
they would locate in regions that historically have had a higher proportion of less-skilled 
workers. Figure 5 reports the concentration of maquiladora employment by state in 2000, 
while Figure 6 illustrates the rise in maquiladora establishments and employment from 
1978 to 2003.       
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) have shown that maquiladoras raise the relative 
demand for skilled workers.  We, too, find that controlling for industry, maquiladoras do 
employ a higher ratio of non-production workers than other manufacturing plants.
12  
Official statistics, however, reveal that maquiladoras are concentrated in relatively low-
skill industries as measured by production worker intensity.  This concentration is evident 
in Table 7, which compares the industrial census data described above with official 
maquiladora statistics.
13  Two trends are noteworthy.  First, the tendency of maquiladoras 
to produce in low-skill industries is manifest in the non-production worker to production 
worker employment ratio being lower in maquiladoras than in overall manufacturing in 
                                                 
11 In fact, the maquiladora program was established in response to the end of the Bracero Program in 1965 
when Mexico needed an employment strategy for migrant workers returning from the United States. 
12 Using data from Mexico's ENESTYC, we estimate a plant-level regression from the 1992 survey of the 
non-production/production worker ratio on a maquila dummy variable, the amount spent on machinery and 
equipment, two-digit industry dummy variables, and a constant (N=4855).  The maquiladora variable has a 
coefficient (standard error) of 0.485 (0.146).  See Alvarez and Robertson (2004) for a more detailed 
description of these data. 
13 Maquiladora data are available from INEGI at 
http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/BDINE/J15/J1500002.HTM.  




all regions.  Taking into account each state’s share of maquiladora employment in total 
manufacturing employment (in the first column of Table 7) indicates that this disparity 
can be quite strong. The Census versus Maquiladora N/P ratios for Baja California Norte 
in 1998, for example, are 0.153 and 0.078, respectively, even though 87 percent of the 
state’s manufacturing workers are employed by maquiladoras.  Second, the table 
indicates that Southern states generally have very little, if any, maquiladora employment.  
We also find that the large increase in maquiladoras does not explain Mexico's 
relatively large exports of skill-intensive goods.  First, the results just reported indicate 
that though maquiladoras are more non-production worker intensive when controlling for 
industry, they inhabit generally less-skill-intensive industries.  Second, Mexico’s data 
collection practices allow for a comparison of maquiladora versus non-maquiladora 
exports.  The discrete break 1991 in the export trends reported in Figure 1 occurs because 
prior to that year, maquiladora exports were not counted as exports.  As is evident from 
the figure, their inclusion does result in a slight drop (increase) in the share Chemicals 
(Machinery) exports, but the overall pattern of exporting remains the same.   
Finally, we note that maquiladoras may actually contribute to Mexico’s lumpiness 
by attracting less-skilled workers to the border.  Table 3a, for example, shows Mexico 
City's falling share of manufacturing employment and the border's rising share of 
employment.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
Prior to trade liberalization, skill-scarce Mexico protected less-skill-intensive 
industries and exported skill-intensive goods.  One explanation for this puzzling behavior 
is Courant and Deardorff’s (1992) theoretical insight that geographic concentration of  




factors within a country can influence countries’ patterns of trade and production.  A key 
consequence of factor lumpiness is significant variation in regional relative wages.  In 
this paper we examine whether Mexico is a “lumpy” country by testing for intra-national 
relative factor price equality.  We find that the relative skilled wage varies significantly 
across Mexican regions.  We demonstrate that this variation is negatively correlated with 
regional skill abundance and positively associated with regional product-mix 
specialization, as implied by theory.   Our analysis implies that Mexico’s overall labor 
abundance may be undermined by regional heterogeneity.       
Our findings suggest several extensions.  First, with respect to the debate about 
trade liberalization and wage inequality in developing countries, it would be useful to 
measure the extent to which factor lumpiness contributes toward rising inequality in a 
broader set of countries.  Mexico’s internal distribution of factors, for example, may be 
different from those of other countries which experienced declining wage inequality 
following trade liberalization (Wood 1997, Inter-American Development Bank 2002).   It 
would also be worthwhile to investigate whether Mexico's exports are more skill-
intensive than those from similarly endowed but less lumpy countries.   
Another fruitful extension of our analysis would be an examination of the 
determinants of factor lumpiness, such as urban agglomeration.  While we find in this 
paper that Mexico is sufficiently lumpy to affect its trade and protection patterns, we do 
not formally inquire into the extent to which this is due to the lure of cities versus the 
influence of Mexico's unique northern border with the United States, where low-skill 
workers have concentrated.      
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Figure 1: Mexican Industrial Export Shares 
 
Year
 Chemicals  Metal Prod Mach
 Textiles








Notes: Textiles includes apparel.  "Metal Prod Mach" is listed as "Machinery" in Table 1.  The discrete 
break 1991 in the export trends reported in Figure 1 occurs because prior to that year, maquiladora exports 
were not counted as exports. 
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Table 1: Skill Intensity of Mexican Industries 
 
      Average Wage  Average Education 




















Paper/Printing 25,648 0.458  6.30  2.06  8.99 11.80  7.75 
Chemicals 232,685  0.434  7.31  2.83 8.97  12.24 7.90 
Food 448,303  0.401  6.88  2.22  7.69  11.68  6.88 
Machinery 84,7634  0.354  6.64  2.33 8.55 12.14 7.90 
Metals 19,238  0.341  7.02  2.51  9.18  12.38  8.07 
Glass 52,295  0.278 7.56  2.22  7.43  11.81  6.62 
Other 3,856  0.274  6.05  1.92  8.49  11.21  7.77 
Wood 31,062  0.246 4.13  1.57  7.27  11.63  6.90 
Textiles 305,411  0.207  4.31 1.93  7.40  11.39  6.97 
Average 392,905  0.338  6.46  2.30  8.19  11.92  7.46 
Notes:   Total Employment and the ratio of non-production workers (N) to production workers (P) 
come from the 1986 Mexican Industrial Census (data from 1985).  Average wages come from the 
Encuesta Industrial Mensual (because the Census does not have hours data) for 1988.    Average 
education data come from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano for 1988. The averages are 
simple averages (not weighted by production value).   See Robertson (2004).   
  







Table 2: Urban Population Shares 
 
  1980 1985 1990 1995  2000 
Mexico 66.4  69.6  72.5  73.4  74.4 
Latin America  65.1  68.1  71.1  73.3  75.4 
World 39.6  41.5  43.5  45.3  47.2 
Europe 69.4  70.9  72.1  72.9  73.4   
Less Dev. Regions  29.3  32.1  35.0  37.7  40.4 
Africa 27.4  29.6  31.8  34.5  37.2 
Asia 26.9  29.4  32.3  34.8  37.5 
Notes:  Data are from the United Nations Population Division World 
Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision to the Population Database 








Table 3a: State Shares of Mexican Manufacturing Employment by Year 
 
        
State 1986  1989  1994  1999 
Aguascalientes 0.011  0.013  0.015  0.017 
Baja California Norte  0.022  0.030  0.044  0.059 
Baja California Sur  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003 
Campeche 0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002 
Chiapas 0.005  0.007  0.008  0.007 
Chihuahua 0.048  0.065  0.070  0.084 
Coahuila 0.035  0.041  0.040  0.046 
Colima 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Distrito Federal  0.208  0.189  0.154  0.119 
Durango 0.014  0.017  0.015  0.017 
Guanajuato 0.042  0.045  0.050  0.055 
Guerrero 0.005  0.005  0.008  0.009 
Hidalgo 0.018  0.016  0.017  0.018 
Jalisco 0.102  0.066  0.069  0.078 
Mexico 0.153  0.144  0.133  0.117 
Michoacan 0.018  0.021  0.021  0.020 
Morelos 0.011  0.011  0.012  0.009 
Nayarit 0.003  0.004  0.004  0.003 
Nuevo Leon  0.076  0.078  0.077  0.077 
Oaxaca 0.009  0.011  0.012  0.012 
Puebla 0.042  0.042  0.049  0.054 
Queretaro 0.019  0.019  0.019  0.002 
Quintana Roo  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.011 
San Luis Potosi  0.018  0.020  0.021  0.018 
Sinaloa 0.012  0.010  0.012  0.010 
Sonora 0.020  0.025  0.027  0.033 
Tabasco 0.004  0.006  0.006  0.005 
Tamaulipas 0.026  0.038  0.041  0.046 
Tlaxcala 0.010  0.010  0.010  0.013 
Veracruz 0.047  0.044  0.034  0.032 
Yucatan 0.011  0.012  0.017  0.017 
Zacatecas 0.002  0.003  0.005  0.006 
        
Total Employment  2,576,775  2,640,472  3,246,042 4,184,682 
 
Notes: Authors' calculations from the Mexican Industrial Census, various 
years.  Totals may not sum to one due to rounding. 
  




Table 3b: Number of Industries Producing in Each State 
 
 
      
State  1986 1989 1994 1999 
Aguascalientes  133 134 168 179 
Baja  California  Norte  168 185 211 212 
Baja  California  Sur  53 55 70 74 
Campeche  60 55 63 78 
Chiapas 78  84  101  130 
Chihuahua  160 168 177 201 
Coahuila  171 184 197 201 
Colima  45 55 76 90 
Distrito  Federal  284 283 278 278 
Durango  101 117 126 142 
Guanajuato  191 192 211 220 
Guerrero 72  74  101  110 
Hidalgo  124 141 174 180 
Jalisco  255 255 256 264 
Mexico  271 272 270 269 
Michoacan  165 157 188 189 
Morelos  127 120 160 179 
Nayarit  76 83 81 90 
Nuevo  Leon  243 249 243 252 
Oaxaca 89  93  117  135 
Puebla  220 217 231 236 
Queretaro  35 31 50 80 
Quintana  Roo  45 37 58 86 
San  Luis  Potosi  173 188 203 204 
Sinaloa  110 114 142 158 
Sonora  158 156 171 193 
Tabasco  53 65 90  107 
Tamaulipas  148 161 195 197 
Tlaxcala  106 105 127 145 
Veracruz  160 175 184 199 
Yucatan  143 152 173 185 
Zacatecas  76 73 95  106 
      
Census  Total  307 304 303 297 
 
Notes: Authors' calculations from the Mexican Industrial 
Census, various years.  Numbers represent the number of 6-digit 
manufacturing industries with positive employment in each 
year.  




Table 4: Initial Estimation Results 
 
  1986 1989  1994  1999 
Aguascalientes -0.212  (3.56)**  -0.190 (3.15)**  -0.249 (4.55)**  -0.293  (5.53)** 
Baja California Norte  -0.350 (6.62)**  -0.363 (7.06)**  -0.345 (7.12)**  -0.364 (7.60)** 
Baja California Sur  -0.344 (3.57)**  -0.489 (5.22)**  -0.393 (4.47)**  -0.394 (4.70)** 
Campeche -0.378  (4.03)**  -0.384 (3.95)**  -0.327 (3.45)**  -0.338  (3.83)** 
Chiapas -0.457  (6.07)**  -0.392 (5.24)**  -0.329 (4.87)**  -0.358  (5.59)** 
Chihuahua -0.153  (2.86)**  -0.160 (3.03)**  -0.103 (1.97)*  -0.155  (3.15)** 
Coahuila de Zaragoza  -0.172 (3.37)**  -0.155 (3.06)**  -0.174 (3.48)**  -0.182 (3.71)** 
Colima -0.592  (5.91)**  -0.444 (4.71)**  -0.388 (4.70)**  -0.459  (5.82)** 
Distrito Federal  0.218 (5.28)**  0.216 (5.16)**  0.210 (4.97)**  0.233 (5.56)** 
Durango -0.288  (4.31)**  -0.349 (5.48)**  -0.330 (5.28)**  -0.295  (4.86)** 
Guanajuato -0.330  (6.68)**  -0.297 (5.84)**  -0.307 (6.25)**  -0.303  (6.37)** 
Guerrero -0.606  (7.43)**  -0.645 (8.06)**  -0.585 (7.72)**  -0.605  (8.54)** 
Hidalgo -0.376  (6.36)**  -0.397 (6.91)**  -0.338 (6.39)**  -0.393  (7.53)** 
Jalisco -0.142  (3.24)**  -0.124 (2.80)**  -0.144 (3.27)**  -0.173  (4.03)** 
Mexico 0.117  (2.75)**  0.119 (2.79)**  0.134 (3.12)**  0.117  (2.75)** 
Michoacan -0.474  (8.96)**  -0.421 (7.56)**  -0.528 (10.13)**  -0.588  (11.58)**
Morelos -0.060  (0.98)  -0.232 (3.73)**  -0.247 (4.36)**  -0.241  (4.49)** 
Nayarit -0.344  (4.19)**  -0.514 (6.43)**  -0.568 (6.88)**  -0.577  (7.41)** 
Nuevo Leon  0.079 (1.79)  0.067 (1.51)  0.059 (1.29)  0.047 (1.06) 
Oaxaca -0.526  (7.46)**  -0.531 (7.66)** -0.526 (7.97)** -0.529  (8.37)** 
Puebla -0.304  (6.53)**  -0.270 (5.71)**  -0.277 (5.93)**  -0.304  (6.65)** 
Queretaro 0.027  (0.31)  0.016 (0.19)  -0.013 (0.15)  -0.056  (0.71) 
Quintana Roo  0.029 (0.30)  0.001 (0.01)  -0.061 (0.67)  -0.137 (1.82) 
San Luis Potosi  -0.256 (4.87)**  -0.215 (4.20)**  -0.206 (4.11)**  -0.290 (5.92)** 
Sinaloa -0.072  (1.11)  -0.154 (2.40)*  -0.137 (2.30)*  -0.188  (3.32)** 
Sonora -0.209  (3.80)**  -0.178 (3.23)**  -0.167 (3.13)**  -0.232  (4.61)** 
Tabasco -0.117  (1.35)  -0.091 (1.08)  -0.159 (2.07)*  -0.050  (0.72) 
Tamaulipas -0.267  (4.82)**  -0.242 (4.50)**  -0.237 (4.71)**  -0.277  (5.63)** 
Tlaxcala -0.185  (2.76)**  -0.169 (2.52)*  -0.221 (3.55)**  -0.261  (4.38)** 
Veracruz -0.151  (2.88)**  -0.211 (4.05)**  -0.166 (3.18)**  -0.237  (4.81)** 
Yucatan -0.255  (4.44)**  -0.314 (5.63)**  -0.240 (4.50)**  -0.243  (4.68)** 
Zacatecas -0.628  (7.85)**  -0.616 (7.60)** -0.663 (9.01)** -0.622  (8.78)** 
Observations 4545  4623  5027  5271 
R-squared 0.14  0.14  0.14  0.16 
 
Notes: Results of estimating equation (5) for each year of the Mexican Industrial Census 
using OLS.  




Table 5: Estimation Results 
Excluding Mexico City and Mexico State 
 
                
 1986  1989  1994  1999 
Aguascalientes -0.099  (1.59)  -0.083(1.32)  -0.138(2.41)*  -0.180(3.25)**
Baja California Norte  -0.246 (4.45)**  -0.258(4.78)**  -0.242(4.80)**  -0.251(5.02)**
Baja California Sur  -0.255 (2.53)*  -0.404(4.11)**  -0.286(3.11)**  -0.289(3.30)**
Campeche -0.309  (3.15)**  -0.286(2.81)**  -0.233(2.36)*  -0.224(2.43)* 
Chiapas -0.073  (1.36)  -0.054(1.02)  -0.076(1.46)  -0.077(1.51) 
Chihuahua -0.498  (4.74)**  -0.341(3.44)**  -0.288(3.35)**  -0.363(4.41)**
Coahuila de Zaragoza  -0.349 (4.44)**  -0.280(3.56)**  -0.222(3.16)**  -0.250(3.74)**
Colima -0.053  (0.94)  -0.059(1.05)  0.004(0.07)  -0.055(1.07) 
Distrito Federal  -- --  ----  ----  ---- 
Durango -0.202  (2.89)**  -0.250(3.73)**  -0.238(3.65)**  -0.200(3.15)**
Guanajuato -0.224  (4.33)**  -0.187(3.51)**  -0.202(3.94)**  -0.198(3.99)**
Guerrero -0.538  (6.30)**  -0.555(6.61)**  -0.490(6.21)**  -0.515(6.96)**
Hidalgo -0.268  (4.34)**  -0.293(4.86)**  -0.235(4.27)**  -0.296(5.42)**
Jalisco -0.041  (0.90)  -0.018(0.39)  -0.039(0.85)  -0.067(1.48) 
Mexico --  --  ----  ----  ---- 
Michoacan -0.364  (6.57)**  -0.310(5.31)**  -0.430(7.92)**  -0.484(9.13)**
Morelos 0.035  (0.55)  -0.121(1.85)  -0.146(2.47)*  -0.135(2.41)* 
Nayarit -0.276  (3.22)**  -0.443(5.28)**  -0.474(5.51)**  -0.482(5.93)**
Nuevo Leon  0.179 (3.89)**  0.179(3.85)**  0.155(3.27)**  0.152(3.28)**
Oaxaca -0.427  (5.79)**  -0.441(6.07)** -0.417(6.06)** -0.414(6.27)**
Puebla -0.191  (3.92)**  -0.159(3.22)**  -0.162(3.32)**  -0.191(4.01)**
Queretaro 0.147  (1.60)  0.134(1.48)  0.100(1.18)  0.055(0.66) 
Quintana Roo  0.113 (1.09)  0.097(0.85)  0.055(0.58)  -0.037(0.46) 
San Luis Potosi  -0.149 (2.72)**  -0.110(2.06)*  -0.101(1.92)  -0.182(3.56)**
Sinaloa 0.012  (0.18)  -0.063(0.94)  -0.043(0.70)  -0.088(1.49) 
Sonora -0.106  (1.84)  -0.075(1.30)  -0.056(1.01)  -0.122(2.32)* 
Tabasco -0.025  (0.28)  -0.030(0.34)  -0.064(0.80)  0.052(0.71) 
Tamaulipas -0.157  (2.71)**  -0.132(2.33)*  -0.120(2.29)*  -0.162(3.16)**
Tlaxcala -0.067  (0.95)  -0.050(0.71)  -0.103(1.59)  -0.135(2.16)* 
Veracruz -0.049  (0.88)  -0.113(2.07)*  -0.070(1.29)  -0.138(2.69)**
Yucatan -0.143  (2.37)*  -0.193(3.28)**  -0.128(2.31)*  -0.133(2.45)* 
Zacatecas -0.519  (6.20)**  -0.513(6.03)** -0.563(7.33)** -0.519(7.01)**
N 3983  4062  4471  4717 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.09   
Notes: Results of estimating equation (5) for each year of the Mexican Industrial Census 
using OLS after excluding Mexico State and Mexico City.  




Table 6: Production Structure Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Number of Industries in Common 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 1986  1989  1994  1999 
| ˆ
s
r α |  -24.772 -32.300  -26.083  -28.037 
 (5.266)**  (6.70)**  (5.61)**  (6.84)** 
No. Ind. Producing in r (Ir) 0.432  0.453  0.505  0.521 
 (34.081)**  (35.93)** (38.84)**  (40.90)** 
No. Ind. Producing in s (Is)  0.408  0.426  0.486  0.526 
 (35.721)**  (36.95)** (41.38)**  (46.70)** 
Constant -31.351  -33.705  -47.416  -53.537 
 (11.760)**  (12.30)** (15.75)**  (17.54)** 
Observations 496  496  496  496 
R-squared 0.83  0.84  0.86  0.88 
Notes: | ˆ
s
r α | is the absolute value of the difference between every regional pair's estimates 
of the coefficients shown in Table 4.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.   
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. 
 
  





Table 7: Maquiladora Employment 1998 
 
  Employment Share  N/P Employment Ratio 
State Maquila/Census  Census  Maquila 
Aguascalientes   0.286  0.261  0.041 
Baja California Norte  0.868  0.153  0.078 
Baja California Sur  0.226  0.319  0.031 
Campeche   0.000  0.357  . 
Coahuila 0.485  0.217  0.056 
Colima 0.000  0.423  . 
Chiapas   0.000  0.311  . 
Chihuahua   0.742  0.152  0.084 
Distrito Federal  0.004  0.506  0.108 
Durango   0.340  0.17  0.052 
Guanajuato 0.048  0.192  0.051 
Guerrero 0.060  0.282  0.022 
Hidalgo   0.008  0.186  0.069 
Jalisco 0.087  0.323  0.126 
Mexico State   0.020  0.352  0.121 
Michoacan 0.000  0.308  . 
Morelos 0.023  0.348  0.092 
Nayarit 0.000  0.316  . 
Nuevo Leon  0.142  0.285  0.090 
Oaxaca   0.000  0.311  . 
Puebla   0.101  0.198  0.047 
Queretaro   0.552  0.422  0.083 
Quintana Roo  0.000  0.299  . 
San Luis Potosi   0.073  0.308  0.027 
Sinaloa 0.022  0.401  0.148 
Sonora   0.644  0.212  0.065 
Tabasco   0.000  0.390  . 
Tamaulipas 0.769  0.239  0.086 
Tlaxcala 0.103  0.243  0.068 
Veracruz   0.000  0.310  . 
Yucatan   0.227  0.266  0.055 
Zacatecas 0.154  0.326  0.070 
Average 0.242  0.293  0.073 
Notes: Maquilas include services as well as manufacturing.  In 1998, and over the 
1990-2003 period, services average 4% of total maquila employment.  INEGI does 
not report data for all states, and we presume this reflects an insignificant number of  




maquiladoras and therefore enter "0" for these states.  The employment ratio is the 
non-production/production worker ratio. 